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Interpreting gene myths in a globalized world 




Debate & public opinion in a globalized world 
 
An empirical field that I have been interested in for some time is public debate and public opinion 
relating to genetic science and gene technology. In a previous paper I have analyzed the British 
and US radical scientists’ critique of genetic science, and the way they intervene in debates with 
references to religious heritage and World War II. In the same paper I also investigate how public 
opinion and popular ideas of science and technology, in particular the myths and folk narratives of 
Faust and Frankenstein, have become key explanatory analytical tools, putting emphasis on public 
opinion as a reflection of “folk beliefs” and cultural images of science (see Svalastog 2012).  In the 
present paper I will focus on the parallelization of religious stories and religious institutions with 
genetic science and engineering in the genetic science debate. I am interested in how this 
parallelization seems to generate one of two outcomes: a) the topic under discussion is transformed, 
it becomes mythic, or b) the author explicitly states that the topic of discussion is not mythic, that 
it is not of cosmological significance, not a drama but something this worldly and with limited 
significance.  
 
Genetic science and gene technology represent research and industries that are part of global 
networks and institutions. Genetic science is based on international collaborations at research units 
at universities and beyond. Gene technology products are manufactured by companies with a global 
range, including multinational and powerful companies in the field of pharmaceutics and plant 
science. Genetic science and gene technology are regulated by international agreements and laws, 
and their products are globally distributed through trade. Examples often used to demonstrate the 
success and promise of such products are the GMO product golden rice, where vitamin A is added 
to prevent disease; the recombinant DNA used in the production of insulin; and the present work 
on GMO manipulated energy wood for the production of ethanol as a replacement for oil products. 
Food, drugs and energy are the main areas of interest in modern genetic science and technology, 
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representing essential human needs. At the same time, these areas of research and industry 
(medicine, agriculture, fuel) are commercial enterprises. They have more on their agenda than the 
common good and people’s heath (Svalastog 2004; Svalastog, Jansson, Gustafsson 2006). 
Criticism has been levelled at new GMO products where organisms have been genetically modified 
to withstand the heavy use of pesticides. This illuminates how the commercial craving for profit 
can be in conflict with risks, including implications for human health, the life of insects, and the 
products’ effect on the balance in local ecosystems. There has also been criticism of the economic 
consequences of sterile GMO (which is the norm for GMO seed) because farmers cannot 
themselves keep aside seed for the next year but have to rely on the GMO industry. And criticism 
has been made of the way past colonial relationships are reinforced through the pharmaceutical 
industry when most research, industry and patents are localized in rich countries while important 
material resources and potential markets are located in former colonies.1 Other critical voices warn 
that gene technology creates new risks because deconstruction of former barriers between plants 
and/or animals opens up pathways for the spread of infections and diseases (Ho 1998). Benefits 
and risks related to genetic science and gene technology have become central themes of public and 
institutional talk and discourses in globalized society.  
 
In today’s globalized world, the ownership and governance of genetic science and gene technology 
are complex issues. Some actors and activities are public, and some are private. People, material 
and knowledge are continuously moving between public sectors with state governance and private 
sectors with private, local or international, governance.2 These shifts and interactions make issues 
regarding accountability, benefit sharing, ownership etc. harder to deal with (Offe 2009). 
Regulation of genetic science and gene technology is divided into separate sectors for research, 
industrial production and trade, and the interplay between these sectors has been challenging.3 
                                                        
1 This critique is parallel to the critique of mining and the oil and gas industries, for example in relation to rare metals 
from Kongo (used in digital devices), and the oil industry in former colonies or on Indigenous peoples’ land (e.g. 
Nigeria and Canada). 
2 In response to new ethical challenges generated by the digital society, the EU has developed the EU data protection 
directive. This directive regulates research on registers (health records, biobanks, demographic databases etc.), and 
ensures individuals’ privacy and integrity. https://gdpr-info.eu  In addition to research on registers, research on 
artificial intelligence (AI) represents a new area of ethical and legal challenges. Three new H2020 projects in this 
field are being financed at EU level, the SIENNA project, the SHERPA project and the PANELFIT project: 
https://www.bundeskanzleramt.gv.at/documents/131008/981155/NEC+Forum/e506a5d3-151b-4eae-a9ff-
c368276c25c3  
3 For analysis of the controversies concerning the commercialisation of biobank research, see Hoeyer and Tutton 
2005; H. Rose 2003. 
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While international networks, trade and movements between sectors have a long history, today’s 
society, based on science and technology, is still understood as representing something historically 
new. Ulrich Beck describes modern society as a “risk society” (Beck 1992), where science and 
technology generate both prosperity and disaster. Genetic science and gene technology fit into 
Beck’s “risk society”, representing both high expectations and concerns regarding its consequences 
for humankind.4 Global society is conventionally defined in terms of new information technology 
and the borderless communication made possible by the internet. In the present paper, globalized 
society is understood as a global web of economic relations, digital communication, and high-risk 
activities.5  
 
In the introductory article of this special issue of the Marburg Journal of Religion (MJR), Peter 
Beyers’ theory on religion and globalization is presented as this issue’s common point of departure. 
The choice is motivated by the influence of Beyer’s work, and by a need for an updated and critical 
review of his thinking. Peter Beyer understands globalization as a consequence of modernity, as a 
new state where activities are organized in functionally specialized social systems - world capitalist 
economy, the political system of sovereign states, the worldwide science and technology, health, 
education and media systems. He states that these systems “represent differentiated means of 
specialized, instrumental communication which have a strong tendency to coopt, undermine, and 
otherwise challenge previously existing group-cultural and personal boundaries, including those of 
the initial, European carriers” (Beyer 1994:99).  
 
  
                                                        
4 The understanding of the risk agent as rational, someone that only needed to be informed to choose the better 
choice, has been heavily criticised in resent years. Still, Beck’s description of risk society is still relevant. See Brown 
2014:391-397.  
5 http://www.unesco.org/new/en/social-and-human-sciences/themes/international-migration/glossary/globalisation  
Immanuel Wallenstein emphasise economics as the key feature of globalization. Beyer presents Wallerstein as one 
former theorist. Beyer emphasises globalization as a ‘common social environment shared by all people on earth and 
that this globally conditions a great deal of what happens here’, Beyer 1994:7. In more resent theories, information 
technology and the world wide web (WWW) is presented as an inseparable part of the global society, see for 
example Deborah Lupton’s “Chapter 2 Theorising digital society”, in D. Lupton 2015 Digital Sociology, London: 
Routledge. In the global social environment there are several communication systems, what he calls globally 
functional systems; “Functional social systems in particular are much closer to specialized techniques or 
perspectives. They are ways of communicating; hence the references to them as instrumental systems’. These 
systems consists of subsystems (including religious systems), and “these are not residual or merely analytic 
categories like ‘cultural’ or ‘social’ systems. They are rather more, relatively autonomous systems of communication 
with their own rationalities, norms and values”, Beyer 1994:55-56. 
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Beyer’s description of globalization is a fusion of four theorists, each of them presented at length 
in his book. Beyer starts his discussion with reference to Immanuel Wallerstein. Wallerstein’s 
Marxism-inspired theory of globalization explains globalization as the result of a historical process 
that led to the rise of modern nation-states and capitalism. (Beyer 1994:16-17). As part of this 
global system, and according to Wallerstein, there is a system of ideas that resolves the 
contradictions and ambiguities of the global capitalist system, to secure the unequal distribution of 
surplus value that is a prerequisite to the accumulation of capital. This means an elimination of 
social barriers on behalf of the market that at the same time assures the unequal distribution 
essential for the accumulation of capital. Accordingly the values produced are both universalistic-
egalitarian ideals and particularistic-inegalitarian ones. This has established various “-isms” – 
racism, ethnocentrism and sexism – as dependent cultural expressions of the world economy just 
as much as the ideals of equality and progress (Beyer 1994:18). The second theorist Beyer presents 
is John Meyer, whose focus is on polity. The nation states are prime legitimate actors in the world 
polity, Meyer states, and they reflect the global ideals of progress and equality (Beyer 1994:23). 
Meyer’s empirical contribution to the globalization discussion is his inclusion of the national 
educational systems built after World War II. Meyer shows how nation states are based on 
individual citizenships and citizens are produced by national education systems (Beyer 1994:25). 
The third theorist Beyer includes is Roland Robertson and his discussion of Toennies’ use of the 
terms Gemeinschaft  and Gesellschaft, i.e. the differentiation between self and society (Beyer 
1994:26). Robertson’s understanding of globalization includes religion, and he concludes, “Hence 
the global system is witness to both the ‘politicization’ of theology and religion … and the 
‘theologization’ of politics” (Beyer 1994:30). The fourth theorist Beyer presents is Niklas 
Luhmann and his understanding of society as a social system consisting of meaningful 
communication (Beyer 1994:33). Beyer constructs an understanding of globalization that draws on 
all the four theorists he presents, and which emphasizes how global society carries with it a set of 
global ideals or cultural norms, first and foremost the ideals of progress and equality. This 
egalitarian world-polity is between nation states, and rests on norms of justice, which legitimize 
the rise of the peripheral state (Beyer 1994:24). Beyer also describes globalization as a process of 
relativization of particularistic identities and of religion (Beyer 1994:4). The combination of 
egalitarian states and relativized identities and religion represents liberal and/or neo-liberal values. 
Because Beyer understands religion as systemic and not just cultural, it can be the locus of a 
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differentiated instrumental subsystem of modern global society. “Religion, in other words, like the 
political system, is a social sphere that manifests both the socio-cultural particular and the global 
universal” (Beyer 1994:67).     
  
Beyer’s understanding of society is system theoretical and based on Luhmann’s understanding of 
society as a social system. It consists of actions in the form of meaningful communication: “Society 
is the encompassing social system that includes all communication … we only reach the boundary 
of a society when communication ceases to occur” (Beyer 1994:33). Beyer operates with a specific 
understanding of how global society came to be, based on Immanuel Wallerstein. In his description 
of how global society evolved, Wallerstein applies a materialist dialectical understanding of 
historic development, and draws on the French Annales school of history with its focus on 
longstanding “mentalities” (Beyer 1994: 15). Within Beyer’s paradigm, identification and 
discussion of global ideas and norms is thus best understood as expressing a global mentality.  
 
The Annales school of history became a key context for two significant theorists of the 20th century, 
namely Michel Foucault (discourse theory) and Claude Lévi-Strauss (structuralism). Beyer’s 
understanding of religion may be understood in relation to the discourse theories developed by 
Michel Foucault, and the binary system of meaning in the structural thinking of Lévi-Strauss.  
 
Combining Wallerstein and Luhmann, Beyer’s understanding of religion and society, in global 
society, seems to coincide with Foucault-inspired discourse theories and their webs of 
communication. Foucault’s understanding of discourse implies a dialectical movement where the 
production of discourses will awaken counter-discourses, which at some point will undermine and 
replace the discourse and awaken a new counter-discourse that in turn will become the new 
discourse, and so on (Foucault 1993 (1971)). Beyer sets out his understanding of religion and 
globalization through his analysis of a series of empirical examples. His empirical material consists 
of contemporary religious expressions. Beyer’s material is well suited to a structuralist analysis 
that identifies and approaches meaning in the form of binary opposites. In Beyer’s analysis, one of 
the products of globalization is the binary opposition between liberal and conservative religious 
social movements and identity projects (Beyer 1994:8-10). And in reference to the theorists he is 
referring to, he discusses and also operates with a set of globalized values, in particular equality 
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and progress. In addition, as discussed above, justice and (neo-) liberal capitalist ideals.6   
 
In contrast to Beyer I approach meaning from a hermeneutical point of view where meaning is 
understood as inseparable from explicit and implicit references, from intertextual as well as extra-
textual contexts. The meaning of a text is understood as multi-potent, reflecting the complexity of 
contextual relations, and interpretation. Different layers of meaning will be identified and made 
visible, depending on which contexts and theoretical perspectives the interpreter involves.  
According to Ricoeur, the central problem of hermeneutics is the attempt to resolve the disastrous 
opposition between explanation and understanding (Ricoeur 1981:43; See also Ricoeur1993).  
 
Gene myth - Concepts and hermeneutics    
 
Genetic science and gene technology have generated stories about origin, movements and 
developments of life on earth, as well as stories about the constitution of life and about change. 
These stories have been used by a variety of stakeholders, focusing on the relation between 
research, technology, industry and prosperity. The use of these stories as strategies for research, 
politics, policies and industry, has generated a broad repertoire of new stories about outcome and 
consequences, including stories about future prosperity and salvation from disease, symptoms, 
starvation, and lack of energy necessary for infrastructure and life in modern society. One may say 
that the stories have been productive in shaping and facilitating opportunities and the development 
of new products. Genetic science and gene technology have thus generated stories aimed at 
defining identity, relationships and dynamics between actors in the drama of life.7 In this respect, 
the narratives and events generated by genetic science and technology have acquired a mythic 
character.  
 
As a concept in the field of Religious Studies, myth is defined as a narrative, usually about gods 
and heroes (Dundes ed. 1984). A myth is expected to carry central themes about origin, how reality 
                                                        
6 “One consequence of the imperial and global extension of the Western-bred systems and their core values is that 
the diffusion of the core values, especially equality and progress (and their variations like dignity, empowerment, 
identity), has gradually become a notable symptom of this globalization”, Beyer 1994:101. See also footnote 5. 
7 It is interesting to note how traditional genres, such as folk genres, are alive and well in present digital society, see 
e.g. Svalastog and Allgaier (2016) on modern fairy tales and emerging technologies. 
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is constituted, who or what populates it and how they are interrelated. Mythic narratives present 
beginnings and plots, which are foundational to past, present and future existence. A mythic 
narrative presents dramas where particular strategies of action are tied to particular and known 
consequences. However, the meaning and relevance of myth is not immediate but the product of 
interpretative action.8  
  
In traditional theological exegetical work in Christian and Jewish traditions, myths and religious 
narratives are interpreted. The meaning of the text (part of a textual corpus) is understood in 
relation to its textual contexts (inter-textuality), in relation to society, and in relation to particular 
situations on which the text is intended or expected to shed light. Myth is treated as a carrier of 
content, as a description or memory of past events with relevance for present and future scenarios. 
The debates and research I investigate in the present paper appear as exegetical objectives, since 
the various actors combine quotations from myth and religious narratives with textual context as 
well as social, historical and economic contexts.   
 
My hermeneutical approach contrasts with Beyer’s understanding of religion as a system that 
generates two political positions (liberal and conservative).  Viewed from the perspective of 
hermeneutics, myths are open to a multitude of interpretative outcomes, generating agreements and 
disagreements between individual interpreters that cannot easily be grouped into two opposite 
positions. When the meaning and function of myth rests on hermeneutical exegetical work, it 
should not be termed systemic or sub-systemic. In this paper I approach myth and religious tradition 
from philosophical traditions that embrace the complexity of context and interpretation. This opens 
up multiple layers of meaning and makes it possible to identify and analyze the relationship 
between different interpreting actors, and the variety of contexts that can be related to a particular 
text, performances, debates or opinions. From a hermeneutical point of view, the interpretative 
possibilities of a mythic corpus are infinite in much the same way as a poem, while the narrative 
itself represents limits on what or how directly a particular part can be used to elaborate a particular 
                                                        
8 I have discussed the meaning and relevance of myth in four interrelated texts, Svalastog 1997, Svalastog 1998, 
Svalastog 2009, Svalastog 2012. The first and third text focus on theoretical elaborations, while the second and forth 
texts turn the concept into analysis of particular empirical fields, one focusing on gender, sexuality and reproduction, 
the other focusing on gene myth.  
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question, problem, challenge, situation.9 Myths and references to religious heritage are thus both a 
strategic construct and an act of enhancement.10  
 
In the present text I focus on how myth and religious heritage have become part of dynamic political 
and social strategies that negotiate and combine academic knowledge of science and modern 
society with knowledge and memory about modern history. I also include references to institutions 
and practices, which rest on myth for their legitimization and function. My material contains 
interpretative practices where the relation and value of particular facts, themes, relations etc. are 
established. The interpretative practice grants or denies mythical status or value to the facts, 
themes, relations etc. that are included in the discussion. To be able to discuss this dual process, I 
use the concepts of mythologization and demythologization. Mythologization implies stating 
something as mythic or related to myth. Demythologization implies the denial of mythic character 
in a statement.11  
 
Generating main questions 
 
My area of interest is public opinion, and attitudes about genetic science and gene technology 
including the “radical science” debate. My source material for this area consists of:  
 
 Analysis of attitudes to genetic science and technology from the Eurobarometer survey in 
Europe, in particular the analyses conducted by Nielsen (et al. 2002); Nielsen (1996) and 
Bauer and Bonfadelli (2002); the Nelkin and Lindee (1995) analysis of the image of the 
gene in US popular culture;  
 To cover the longer perspective on science, opinions and attitudes I have included Turney's 
inquiry (1998) in the field of the history of ideas, focusing on perceptions of biology; de 
Chaderevian's inquiry (2002) in the field of science history, focusing on post-war science 
                                                        
9 Svalastog 2009. On interpretation of myths and poems see Douglas 1967. On interpretation of texts, see Ricoeur 
1993:53ff. 
10 I have discussed poststructuralist, postmodern and discourse theories elsewhere, see Svalastog 1998:84-95; 
Svalastog 2006; Svalastog 2009. 
11 The strategies I identify as demythologization are not identical with, but similar to Rudolf Bultmann’s theological 
strategy of historical critical analysis, demythologization, which aimed to identify non-mythic aspects, in Bultmann’s 
case specifically of the New Testament. 
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history; and the analysis of the relation between modern science and society by Allen and 
Baker (2001). 
 Texts on the gene science debates include key figures from the radical science groups in 
the USA and the UK, in particular Lewontin (1991), H. Rose (2003), S. Rose (1997; S. 
Rose ed. 1982), H. Rose & S. Rose (1969) Ho (1998). The radical science groups are 
scientists who debate genetic science and gene technology in public through the production 
of popular books on genetic science and technology.12 I also include Segerstråle’s analysis 
(2000) of the debate between the radical science group and its opponents (foremost 
Lewontin and Wilkins).  
 
The most consistent finding in my material is that the researchers and research that I have been 
analyzing argue for a relationship between people’s opinion (whether positive or negative) and past 
events. In those parts of my material that analyze diversity of opinion and controversies regarding 
the development and use of new technology, cultural narratives and culture-specific norms and 
values are put forward as a main explanatory factor. Furthermore, cultural narratives, norms and 
values tend to be understood as being counter to scientific knowledge. When social scientists 
Torben Hviid Nielsen, Erling Jelsøe and Susanna Öhman analyzed the results of the Eurobarometer 
surveys of public opinion on genetic science and gene technology, they concluded that resistance 
to genetic science and gene technology could not be explained by traditional social variables like 
low or high levels of knowledge (about genetic science and gene technology), but by cultural 
perceptions (Nielsen et al. 2002). The shift from ‘hard’ social variables to ‘soft’ variables and 
‘symbols’ pushes the analysis in a cultural analytical direction. The cultural analytical approach 
consists of a search for culturally specific narratives working as cultural carriers of the norms and 
values that are expressed in opinions skeptical of the new technology. The analysts of the 
Eurobarometer survey identify two narratives, namely the story of Faust and the story of 
Frankenstein. The argument is that these two narratives could be used to label, or even represent 
the content and history of what they had identified as two distinct and different groups of skeptics 
of genetic science and gene technology (Nielsen et al. 2002; Nielsen et al. 2000).  
 
                                                        
12 The US and British radical science groups constitute a group in so far as they represent a common critical political 
and scholarly project, refer to each other, and in various constellations also produce work together, S. Rose 1997:x. 
See also Segerstråle 2000. I have discussed and analysed this group in Svalastog 2012.  
MARBURG JOURNAL OF RELIGION, Vol. 22, No. 2 (2020) 
 
10 
The underlying concerns of the ‘green’ and ‘blue’ arguments are as distinct as the different 
social groups that tend to express them. The ‘blue’ argument is supported by moral (or 
religious) values, the ‘green’ by notions of uncertainty. In this sense, the ‘blue’ critique is 
‘Faustian’ … In contrast the ‘green’ skepticism is more ‘Franksensteinian’. The problematic 
they identify concerns the insufficient knowledge of potential consequences.13  
 
The analysis by Nielsen, Jelsøe and Öhman correlates with Ullica Segerstråle’s thorough analysis 
of the gene science debate (Segerstråle 2000). Segerstråle focuses on the controversies between the 
two evolutionary biologists Richard Charles Lewontin and Edward O. Wilson. Segerstråle finds 
the similarities of their lives, age, interests, locations and research methods striking given their 
irreconcilable controversies, and concludes that it is their different metaphysical underpinnings, 
not scientific disagreement, that is the main reason for the two scientists’ different stances in the 
gene-science debate. The metaphysical differences concern the grand opposition between 
existentialism and essentialism, and between free will and determinism (Segerstråle 2000:391). 
 
In folklore and religious studies the meaning of a narrative, or part of a narrative, is understood in 
relation to the further textual context of the tradition, as well as inter-textual contexts, and socio-
economic function and contexts. The socio-economic contexts are elaborated in the analysis of the 
Eurobarometer surveys as well as in Segerstråle's analyses. Nevertheless, it is not an aspect 
integrated into their conclusions on why individuals approve or disapprove of genetic research and 
gene technology.14 From my point of view it is important to include analysis of inter-textual 
references. For example, in texts produced by the UK and the US radical science groups, references 
to religious heritage are juxtaposed with references to World War II and “Big Science”.15 Religious 
heritage and war history are textually linked and therefore need to be investigated more thoroughly 
as a context that produces meaning in the texts of the radical science groups. Regarding genetic 
science and gene technology, there exist a variety of issues that touch upon, and agendas that 
concern, genetic science and gene technology. How these issues and agendas differ cannot be 
                                                        
13 Nielsen et al 2002:190f. 
14 For an analysis of early twentieth-century scientific critique in the USA, see Gormley 2009. 
15 See for example S. Rose 1997:274f. Big science refers to interdisciplinary scientific projects aiming at solving a 
particular problem with large-scale outcome or consequences. The Manhattan project was the first and most famous 
one.  
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explained with reference to cultural images or personal belief alone. For example, in Europe GMO 
seem to be more controversial than pharmaceutics while the USA has been more preoccupied with 
debating genetic information of humans, and countries in Africa have focused on the question of 
benefit sharing and post-colonial practices. Regulation of gene technology also differs on different 
continents. The USA regulates actual applications of gene technology, while Europe regulates the 
technology itself. In addition, politics and history are implied and also important to understand, if 
one wants to answer the question why and how opinions differ. In short, to understand the 
relationship between history and present opinions and controversies, it is necessary to grasp its 
complexity.  
 
The main questions for my material are: 
 
 Are references to religious and folk narratives in genetic science and gene technology 
debates primarily a matter of religious belief and folk tradition, or do they relate to wider 
social, economic, and historic concerns? 
 Are the references to World War II in these debates only figurative, or do they reflect past 
and present actions, relations and politics? 
 To what extent do attitudes and public opinion of genetic science and gene technology 
reflect knowledge about science, technology and modern history?  
 
Mythologization and demythologization  
 
In the book DNA as cultural icon, Nelkin and Lindee (1995) analyze a vast collection of examples 
of how the human genome and genetic science and information are presented in contemporary US 
society. Their collection covers popular culture, media, and academia. In their analysis they point 
out how metaphors representing Jewish-Christian religious heritage are employed in presentations 
of the human genome and in presentations of gene knowledge and gene technology. Their 
conclusion is that the genome has replaced the Christian concept of the soul in modern society. 
References to religious myths, the garden of Adam and Eve, the tree of knowledge, the Book of 
Man (a paraphrase of the Book of Life) etc., are typical in the material Nelkin and Lindee present, 
and they argue that the human genome in popular culture is best understood as a religious image 
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related to faith: 
 
Indeed, DNA has assumed a cultural meaning similar to that of the Biblical soul. It has 
become a sacred entity, a way to explore fundamental questions about human life, to define 
the essence of human existence, and to imagine immortality. Like the Christian soul, DNA 
is an invisible but material entity, an 'extract of the body' that has 'permanence leading to 
immortality'. And like the Christian soul, DNA seems relevant to concerns about morality, 
personhood, and social place. (Nelkin & Lindee 1995:40) 
 
Nelkin and Lindee emphasize how scientists themselves have embraced this folk-conception of the 
genome: 
 
Geneticists also refer to the genome as the Bible, the Holy Grail, and the Book of Man. 
Explicit religious metaphors suggest that the genome – when mapped and sequenced – will 
be a powerful guide to moral order. Other common references to the genome as a dictionary, 
a library, a recipe, a map, or a blueprint construct DNA as a comprehensive and unbiased 
resource, an orderly reference work. (Nelkin & Lindee 1995:8) 
 
When Nelkin and Lindee state that the genome is mythic or related to myth, they are pointing 
towards processes of mythologization of genetic science and gene technology. And when the gene, 
in the material they analyze, is presented in mythic terms, research and activities that include the 
genome appear to be actions of religious or sacrilegious character. Nelkin and Lindee argue that 
representations of the genome in the material they analyze are in contrast to scientific truth and 
knowledge: 
 
The powers of the gene in popular culture - expansive, malleable, sometimes fantastic - derive 
not from evolutionary forces or biological mandates, but rather from social or political 
expectations. Infused with cultural meanings, the gene has become a resource that is too 
readily appropriated, too seldom criticized, and too frequently misused in the 
service of narrow or socially destructive ends. (Nelkin & Lindee 1995:198f) 
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Nelkin and Lindee identify popular perceptions of the genome as myth, and thus as false belief and 
misconception. When analyzing the politics that is or can be attached to these popular perceptions 
their conclusions lead to harsh warnings and critique.  
 
In my terminology one could say that the strategy adopted by Nelkin and Lindee is to 
demythologize the popular perception of the genome. I have discussed the theoretical limitation of 
their analysis elsewhere (Svalastog 2012). What I want to point out here is that their analysis and 
critique rest on phenomenological assumptions about what reality consists of or does not consist 
of. And when they dismiss references to religious heritage as misconceptions of a phenomenon that 
does not exist, misconception becomes an analytical endpoint.16 Thus, Nelkin and Lindee reduce 
popular images of the gene to belief/religious myth, and then they counter these images with 
complex and scientific knowledge, underlining a modern secular worldview. Their strategy of 
mythologization (identifying the gene with myth), does not lead to complex analysis of popular 
images, but to a counterstrategy of ‘demythologization’, aimed at undermining what they identify 
as a false gene myth in present-day society. However, they provide no new information on how, 
where, and for what purposes the gene myth appears.   
 
A parallel strategy to that of Nelkin and Lindee, also using mythologization and demythologization, 
can be found in R. C. Lewontin’s book The Doctrine of DNA - Biology as Ideology (1991). In this 
book Lewontin discusses images used by scientists rather than popular images. Lewontin’s 
underlying aim is the same as Nelkin’s and Linee’s: to criticize arguments he finds oversimplified 
and not in line with scientific knowledge. 
 
Lewontin asks what it is that is required for an institution to explain the world in a way that gives 
itself legitimacy. He concludes that: a) as a whole the institution must appear to derive from sources 
outside of ordinary human social struggle, and not seem to be the creation of political, economic, 
or social forces but descend into society from a supra-human source; b) its explanations and 
pronouncements must seem to be true in an absolute sense and to derive somehow from an absolute 
source, and be true for all time and all places; and c) the institution must have a certain mystical 
                                                        
16 I have discussed Nelkin’s and Lindee’s phenomenological understanding of myth elsewhere, and pointed out how 
it entails a loss of context and politics, see Svalastog 2012. 
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and veiled quality so that its innermost operations are not completely transparent to everyone. This 
description, he states, “also fits science and has made it possible for science to replace religion as 
the chief legitimating force in modern society” (Lewontin 2001[1991]:7). Lewontin compares 
science with the role of the Church in previous times: “Despite its claim to be above society, 
science, like the Church before it, is a supremely social institution, reflecting and reinforcing the 
dominant values and views of society at each historical epoch” (Lewontin 2001[1991]:9). In these 
quotations, science is paralleled with religion, with religious institutions’ function as a bearer of 
views and values, and with the Church as a powerful “chief legitimating force” in modern society. 
Lewontin’s analysis of how science become myth might also be understood as a process of the 
mythologization of science, a process that makes it possible, and even morally important for him 
to deconstruct and demythologize it. As in the case of Nelkin and Lindee, it is history and politics, 
not theology or beliefs that are Lewontin's target.  
 
In the process of defining gene science, Lewontin refers to World War II: 
 
Except for a brief interruption around the time of the Second World War, when the crimes of 
Nazism made claims of innate inferiority extremely unpopular, biological determinism has 
been the main-stream commitment of biologists. Yet these claims are made without a shred 
of evidence and in contradiction to every principle of biology and genetics. (Lewontin 
1991[2001]:26) 
 
In Lewontin's presentation, genes are discredited as a valid starting point for specific and widely 
distributed visions of the human being, and as something that contains an inner self-disclosing 
truth, representing an isolated key determining factor, and thus leading to a reductionist 
understanding of human life. Lewontin deconstructs, trivializes and secularizes genetic science, 
pointing out that genetic knowledge so far has had limited value from a clinical point of view, and 
that today's main global medical problems are old problems that most of all need to be given 
economic priority, in order to distribute already well-known solutions. (Lewontin 1991[2001]:71) 
Again, Lewontin demythologizes the scientific work and its potential explanatory value by 
presenting gene-knowledge as partial, uncertain and not determinative.  
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Another example of a researcher who combines references to genes, myth and World War II is 
Stephen Rose. 
 
Speculation about the origin of life of course goes back far beyond present-day biology. It 
forms part of the creation myths of most cultures. [...] For the three letters of GOD, substitute 
DNA's four: ACGT. In the Jewish religion within which I was raised, it was sacrilege to 
speak the hidden name of God except on the sacred occasion of the Day of Atonement, Yom 
Kippur. Today's molecular biologists, however, with all their Frankensteinian insouciance, 
have no qualms about not merely speaking but even manipulating the sacred letters. (S. Rose 
1997:250, 251) 
 
Steven Rose contrasts the Jewish understanding of “the letters of GOD” with the modern scientists' 
approach to the four nucleotides that constitute DNA, thus stating that some actions are sacrilege. 
His description of today’s gene technology transforms the religious prohibition into a theological 
critique of modern genetic science. This is underlined with a reference to Frankenstein, a European 
story of a man/scientist who has forgotten that God is the only creator, and when crossing the 
limitations for actions that men are allowed to conduct, he produces a monster. Frankenstein 
represents a story about how the loss of basic knowledge about human beings' place on earth leads 
to disastrous consequences. Rose’s narrative strategy makes present-day genetic research appear 
as part of a (cosmological) drama where what is at risk is fatal for mankind. It has consequences 
for life itself. The risk has evolved as a result of the loss of memory, and the 
trivialization/secularization of what ought to be holy.  
 
In theories of myths, creation myths have been understood as the starting point for all other myths 
in a mythic complex (Eliade 1958: Chapter XII). S. Rose treats myths as the origin and universal 
containers of knowledge about ontology. In Rose's argumentation, the genome is the beginning 
that cannot be changed without consequences for all other beginnings. To do wrong, to try to 
transcend ontological and pre-given premises, is hazardous, just as in the story of Frankenstein. 
His parallelization of the four letters of the divine name in Hebrew with the ACGT of the gene 
gives the story of scientific action what theories of myths call a “function of myth”; it structures 
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thoughts and behavior and provides a source for the construction of meaning and reality.17 He 
makes this strategy explicit in the preface to his book: 
 
Here I criticize many of their arguments robustly; but it is the arguments, together with the 
metaphysical assumptions behind the arguments and their implications for both biology and 
culture, that concern me, not the individual who put them forward. The stakes are high: how 
do we, not just as biologists but as denizens of the late twentieth century, culturally 
understand nature? (S. Rose 1997: xiii) 
 
Rose’s preface starts off with reference to Nazi Germany's norms and values, and how the 
reappearance of reductionism in modern science is the background to his and other radical-science 
authors’ work (S. Rose 1997: ix-x). If hermeneutics strive to find inter-textual relations, the prime 
concern for Rose does not seem to be religious, but political, and tied to an ambition to continue to 
analyze relations to and consequences of science in recent history. Rose’s text appears as an explicit 
interpretative action, where the contemporary situation is interpreted and argued for in relation to 
a variety of contexts and texts. The argumentative strategy employed in his critique implies 
mythologization. He uses myth as a means to transform the scientific debate by 
superimposing/revealing (depending on the reader's interpretation) cosmological dimensions and 
consequences. Rose's references to religious heritage are tied to the history of modern society, not 
to stories of religious life. It is as a repetition of particular implications and consequences of science 
during and after World War II that S. Rose wants to avoid. When historical (or ontological, 
depending on the reader) and political (or cosmological) concerns are put into a mythic language, 
it is past events, and human beings, that constitute the horror, not God or mythic agents. The 
outcome of this mythologization is that contemporary history and human activity become actors in 
a drama. S. Rose's reference to science or research related activities and atrocities during World 
War II overlap with well-known critics of modern genetics (Segerstråle 2000).  
 
  
                                                        
17 Eliade1958: Chapter XIII; Pals 1996; Paden 1988:69ff. 
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Another example of mythologization in this “war of interpretations” is found in the work of Mae 
Wan Ho. Ho employs references to religious heritage by adopting the language of Jewish-Christian 
prophetic and apocalyptic literature. In her influential book Genetic Engineering. Dream or 
Nightmare? she writes: 
 
The Brave New World. As the twentieth century draws to a close, people are wakening up to 
the realisation that genetic-engineering biotechnology is threatening to take over every aspect 
of their lives [...] many have asked, isn't it a bit too late in the day to tell us that? Yes and no. 
Yes, because I, who should perhaps have known better, was caught unprepared like the rest. 
And no, because there are so many people who have been warning us of this, eventually, 
people who have campaigned tirelessly on our behalf, some of them from the earliest days of 
genetic engineering in the nineteen-seventies, though we may have paid them little heed. And 
no, it is not too late, if only because that was precisely what we were being encouraged to 
believe.”18  
 
Like the prophets of the New Testament and the Old Testament in Christian tradition, Ho refers to 
earlier warnings, presents her vision, appeals to people's life, and proclaims that although there is 
not much time left, faith and conversion are still possible options – indeed, the only options.19 Ho's 
use of a well-known religious genre  the apocalypse where the god speaks through his/her prophet  
underlines the urgency of the matter she discusses. But, once again, it is the link between a this-
worldly past and future, not religious worlds or truths as such, that is important to her. 
 
Researchers who celebrate genetic science also use metaphors drawn from the Jewish-Christian 
heritage. The Nobel Prize winner Walter Gilbert wrote an article named “A Vision of the Grail”. 
The article starts as follows: “The information carried on the DNA, that genetic information passed 
down from our parents, is the most fundamental property of the body” (Gilbert 1992:83). Gilbert 
is careful to include both the biological and social complexity of gene knowledge, though he puts 
forward the human genome as a main key to understand the human organism: “The molecular 
                                                        
18 Ho 1998:1,5. Compare with Nowotny (1979:10) and her references in footnote 18. 
19 Ho’s references to earlier debates are problematic since critical analysis of science came from within science, for 
example the Paul Berg letter, and debates on genetic science and gene knowledge have concerned social and 
economic consequences. 
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biologist's view is that this organism is defined by its DNA. That DNA molecule can be sequenced 
to reveal the essential information that defines that type of organism and hence the species” (Gilbert 
1992:84f). When taken together with his presentation of genes as essential information, it seems 
fair to characterize the title of his article, “A Vision of the Grail”, as mythologization. The title 
captures the possibilities of genetic science and points towards knowledge of fundamental value.  
 
The critiques’ skeptic inquiries of genetic science and gene technology are directed towards 
simplifications and misconceptions made by scientists and society regarding the complex social 
and political implications related to genetic science: 
 
The scientists writing about the Genome Project explicitly reject an absolute genetic 
determinism, but they seem to be writing more to acknowledge theoretical possibilities than 
out of conviction [...]. It is only the social scientists and social critics, such as Kevles, who 
comes to the Genome Project from his important study of the continuity of eugenics with 
modern medical genetics; Dorothy Nelkin, both in her book with Laurence Tancredi and in 
her chapter in Kevles and Hood; and most strikingly, Evelyn Fox Keller in her contribution 
to The Code of Codes, for whom the problem of the development of the organism is central. 
Nelkin, Tancredi, and Keller suggest that the importance of the Human Genome Project lies 
less in what it may, in fact, reveal about biology, and whether it may in the end lead to a 
successful therapeutic program for one or another illness, than in its validation and 
reinforcement of biological determinism as an explanation of all social and individual 
variation. (Lewontin 1991:64f) 
 
The hermeneutical process of mythologization and demythologization appear to be part of a fight 
for the future and humankind, like battles in a war. Which interpretation will win? At stake are not 
the norms and values of global society that Peter Beyer presents: equality, progress, justice, and 
capitalism, which I perceive in the sense of (neo-)liberal values. It is the relation between past, 
present and future life that is discussed in this interpretative struggle. Questions asked by 
participants in the debate are about implementation of politics, which norms and values a particular 
interpretation will establish, and which social, economic and further consequences its outcome will 
be. The backdrop is not religion but World War II, and the experience that science, when 
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implemented in society, generates consequences. As stated by Hilary Rose and Steven Rose: “Not 
really until the Second World War was the scientific underpinning of our society recognized” (H. 
Rose & S. Rose 1969:131). The globalized values Beyer discusses represent an understanding 
where the present and the future are in contrast to, or even cut off from, the past. In contrast, the 
gene science debate focuses on the interrelatedness between past and future. How the present is 
tied to our past continues, and how the past, depending on how conscious and critical we are, will 
strengthen, transform, limit or undermine our lives and future. And to have a future, we need to 
fight for it. The issues at stake are not individual freedom, but the sustainability of society and 
nature, of which society and life is an integral part. Equality is an issue, but more than that, the 
critique is directed towards reductionism, the risk of modern science to reduce what it means to be 
human, for all of us.  In contrast to the values identified by Peter Beyer, those of the globalized 
world are not uniform or dichotomous, but multiple. 
 
World War II and ‘The scientific underpinning of our society’ 
 
In this section I focus on contexts that can help identify more layers of meaning in the gene science 
debate and regarding public opinions about genetic science and gene technology. The radical 
science debate goes back to the 1950s, which is before the information technology’s underpinning 
of global society, gene science and gene technology. The relationship between present-day science 
and technology, and science during World War II relates not to information technology but to 
methodology. The first large-scale project that combined science, industry and 
governments/politics was the Manhattan project and the production of the atomic bomb. For the 
very first time a multidisciplinary research team, with researchers who represented a spectrum of 
competences, were gathered together in order to solve a specific problem. Due to the productivity 
of the group (the bomb was developed), it showed how science could be a productive strategy for 
society. And after the war, the scientists who had participated in war projects had become part of 
new productive networks of academics, industry and politics. These scientists were rewarded with 
new positions, influence and productive contacts, and an entirely new situation for scientific work 
had appeared (de Chaderevian 2002). Science had become a problem-solving activity with huge 
potential, and both destructive and life-giving results became self-evident as plausible outcomes. 
This is in contrast to the pre-war conception of science where success was perceived as a possible 
MARBURG JOURNAL OF RELIGION, Vol. 22, No. 2 (2020) 
 
20 
but not certain outcome that might be achieved after long periods of uncertainty, non-productivity 
and failure. After WWII, productivity became an argument for a future based on science, at the 
same time as productivity continued to be a double-edged sword. References to the development 
of penicillin became important, and biophysics and penicillin came to represent life science, in 
sharp contrast to the Manhattan project (i.e., physics) and its results that came to represent death 
science (de Chaderevian 2002:75). Examples of success (penicillin) implied industrial success, and 
the vision of science as the key to a healthy future, bringing fortune to both individuals and society, 
was established. The US and UK radical science groups started to publish their critique in the 
1950s, and the post-war changes in how research was organized, industrialized and politicized were 
well known by them. They knew very well how wartime and post-war research politics had shaped 
and changed science, how it was organized and governed, in a close relationship between 
governments and industry, with an explicit intention of producing knowledge and products that 
could be implemented in society and industry.  
 
After the thriving economy of the seventies came the downward trend of the 1980s and 1990s in 
Europe. Science became viewed less as a “medical solution” for social problems and more as a 
provider of solutions to industries and national economies.20 In the 1980s, the understanding of 
gene technology as an area with great potential became important in politics, resulting in increased 
funding for research in this field. Belief in the importance and the profound changes that genetic 
knowledge would bring, as written above, turned gene technology into a cultural vision. This was 
illustrated by iconography and metaphors in the discussions of gene science and gene technology, 
and connected gene science and technology with religious creation myths or miracle stories. Books 
about gene technology had covers depicting Adam and Eve holding the apple of knowledge, and 
references to the Holy Grail, visually or literally, picturing genetic science as the first step in the 
revelation of the secrets of the human being who was now permitted to look into the “Book of Life” 
(in addition to Nielsen et al. 2002, see Nelkin & Lindee 1995, Turney 1998, and Keller 2002, 2000, 
1995). It is fair to say that the level of fear in the academic and political-polemic discussions is 
                                                        
20 “Starting in the USA in the early 1980 s, public attention also shifted to the industrial potential of the technology 
[...] Accordingly, it was believed that those who missed the chance to be at the forefront of technological innovation 
would put the welfare of their nation at peril: biotechnology had to be made to happen”, Torgersen et al. 2002:36. 
This vision of economic profit had been integrated into government politics long before the economic repression of 
the 1990s. This economic argument was a rationale for governmental politics already in the late 19500s and early 
1960s, see H. Rose and S. Rose 1969:131. 
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proportional to the high expectations surrounding genetic science and gene technology, the 
standards set up for governing (on the national and transnational levels), the importance and 
prestige attributed to it, the distribution of money, and the expected outcome.  
 
There was an incident that made scientists fear that gene technology could lead to horrific epidemic 
consequences. In 1973, Professor Paul Berg and his colleagues at Stanford University planned to 
insert DNA from a virus, SV40, into the E. coli bacterium. Nature published an anonymous article 
that criticized the attempt for not handling the obvious risk related to the known possibility of the 
virus causing cancer in human cells. The obvious risk referred to was an epidemic spread of cancer. 
Professor Berg was appointed head of a committee of pioneer American biologists. The 
committee's work resulted in the Berg letter in Nature and Science under the title Potential 
Biohazards of Recombinant DNA Molecules. This letter had a strong impact on the scientific 
community, and was understood in relation to Albert Einstein's famous open letter to the UN 
General Assembly in 1947.21 The focus on potential epidemic consequences, and the associations 
with Einstein's earlier letter, became the main frame for risk discussions in the field of genetic 
science and gene technology. It confirmed that genetic science and gene technology were a so-
called Big Science, in parallel to physics and the atomic bomb. The letter constructs an apocalyptic 
vision. The result of the Berg letter and subsequent discussion was a one-year moratorium on these 
particular scientific experiments. In addition, the National Institutes of Health (NIH) established a 
counseling committee to develop guidelines for scientists. At a meeting in Asilomar in 1975, 150 
scientists accepted the first guideline proposal, which led to the lifting of the moratorium (Nielsen 
et al. 2000:257f.; Torgersen et al. 2002:29ff). 
 
This scenario, from the anonymous article in Nature to the first proposal in 1975, was the first 
broad discussion of biotechnology and risk handling, and the first debate where biotechnology 
appears as a Big Science. The scientific question asked in the moratorium was whether the use of 
a virus could transform cancer into an epidemic disease. Questions about the transfer of genetic 
material and risk due to transgression of borders between different forms of life reappear in the 
later discussions of gene technology. Because gene technology appeared as a Big Science, gene 
technology appeared as dangerous. The danger was not primarily a matter of implied norms and 
                                                        
21 The Paul Berg letter: https://www.mcdb.ucla.edu/Research/Goldberg/HC70A_W10/pdf/BergLetter.pdf  
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values, but a matter of the productivity of science and technology.  
 
Both the critical voices, the discussion and moratorium, came from within the scientific community 
itself. This represents a new situation for post-war science. After the revelations at the 1945 
Nuremberg trials of medical experiments in Nazi Germany, biologists were confronted with their 
own version of the moral dilemma posed to physics after Hiroshima and Nagasaki (Allen & Baker 
2001:149,158). In particular, the questions of informed consent and of the scientists' responsibility 
for human health and possible dual uses of their research results became important. The 1964 
Declaration of Helsinki became a collective answer to the need for research guidelines and ethics. 
Before the Declaration of Helsinki, UNESCO issued a statement in 1952 that made it impossible 
to legitimately refer to race as an explanatory factor for human behavior. The fact that UNESCO, 
part of the UN organization, took such a stance is an indication of the political and ethical 
importance of the question and helps explain the level of the controversies that later became 
attached to the gene science debates and gene technology (See also Gormley 2009). 
 
The scientific underpinnings of society, with special reference to genetic science and gene 
technology, are both extensive and deep. The complexity and depth underlines relations between 
past and present, and how past and present defines future situations, relations and conditions. The 
relation between medical ethics and World War II is not as straight forward as often presented in 
retrospect (Hoeyer 2009:271; Svalastog, Gustafsson and Jansson 2006:473). But the post-war 
situation where researchers took on the role of becoming watch dogs is new and a direct 
consequence of World War II. The US and UK radical science group represents this practice, and 
moral obligation, of scientists, to be involved in public debate and risk analysis of research and the 
politics, norms and values it represents and/or produces.  
 
At stake – some remarks on Beyer and globalization  
 
The gene science debate and European public opinion on genetic science and gene technology are 
concerned with the implementation of scientific knowledge in agriculture, medicine and 
pharmaceutics. Progress in genetic research depends on technological development and the 
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capacity of existing, or the development of new equipment,22 global cooperation, and regulation 
and law. Globalization and governance are two processes and contexts that add complexity of 
meaning to genetic science and gene technology. All these aspects are of importance in public 
debate and public opinion. In contrast to Beyer’s understanding of religious sub-systems, genetic 
science and gene technology do not represent a post-modern sub-system aimed at producing 
(group) identities and/or discursive power. The proponents and critics of genetic science and gene 
technology alike claim that genetic science and gene technology are productive, that they produce 
empirically grounded knowledge (not mere discourses) and products (not mere social or discursive 
positions). The disagreement between critics and proponents raises questions about how relevant, 
accurate, comprehensive and valuable the new information, knowledge and products are, and 
whether or not they challenge the norms and values that can hinder modern war history from 
repeating itself.  
 
Globalization is more than economy and (neo-)liberal norms and values, just as genetic science 
and gene technology are something other than systems of communication. It is politics and 
industries that create or aim to create consequences and changes that cannot easily be reversed, or 
analyzed as a mere moment in a dialectical process of discourses and counter-discourse. When 
large amounts of sterile GMO affect insect lives, or when GM crops are modified to resist pesticides 
and we get unwanted chemicals in vegetables and fruits, or when a fetus is selected or aborted due 
to gender or genetic features, when genetic screening affects job opportunities or insurance 
policies, then conditions, society and nature, change for all of us. We need to find ways to discuss 
global society that are not limited to explaining its genealogy but make us able to transcend the 
limitations of what Beyer identifies as global modes of communication and of identities. 
 
Public opinion – Faust and Frankenstein 
 
Does the analysis of genetic scientists’ debates have any bearing on the analysis of public opinion? 
Above I have presented contexts, and argued that these contexts can contribute to our analysis of 
                                                        
22 One example is new information technology with the capacity to combine and process vast amounts of 
information, technology crucial to present epidemiological research on common complex diseases. Another example 
is electro magnetic microscopes that can photograph and send pictures of cellular level to computers for enlargement 
and further processing of information, important in present research on amyloid-diseases. 
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underpinnings in the gene science debate. The fact that it is scientists who are agents in the debate 
makes it difficult to argue that disagreement can be explained by different levels of scientific 
knowledge. In addition, I have shown how their references to historical and political contexts are 
intertwined, and how this makes their references to religious heritage reflect this-worldly concerns 
and not religious beliefs or attitudes.  
 
In Europe, a large EU-funded research group, coordinated by Martin W. Bauer and George Gaskell, 
worked for eight years on questions related to public opinion, analyzing differences and common 
patterns in the public debate and public opinion about gene science and gene technology.23 The 
main material for the different national research groups was a combination of the Eurobarometer 
surveys from the 1990s up to the most recent survey in 2002, together with analysis of texts on 
gene science and gene technology in leading national newspapers over the last thirty years. The 
survey questionnaire focused on knowledge of genetic science, gene technology, and attitude. The 
answers to the surveys showed that knowledge and attitude did not correspond. This was in contrast 
to the communication theory the analysts used, a theory that stated that there is a correspondence 
between knowledge and a positive attitude to new technologies. They also assumed that public 
debate, rather than public information, contributes to the spread of knowledge about a new 
technology to a broader group in society: “[P]ublic attention and awareness are a precondition for 
the formation of clear images, opinions and attitudes about an emergent technology.”24 This is 
because debate initiates private discussions, and makes the topic a theme of conversation that leads 
to a general rise in the level of knowledge, and lack of public debate results in a lack of public 
knowledge, and conflicts with democratic values. 
 
Regarding genetic research and gene technology, the debate has been loud and far-reaching. Still, 
the survey answers from the Eurobarometer survey could not be explained by science 
                                                        
23 The International Research Group on Biotechnology and the Public, initially fifty researchers, later eighty 
researchers, coordinated by Durant and Gaskell, supported by the European Commission through the European 
Community Concerted Action “Biotechnology and the European Public”, starting with Contract Nr. B104-CT95- 
0043. Three volumes have been published: Durant et al. ed. 1998; Gaskell & Bauer 2001; Bauer & Gaskell 2002. In 
addition, project results and doctoral theses within the group have been published separately, e.g. Olofsson 2002; 
Öhman 2002. 
24 Bauer and Bonfadelli 2002:149f.. “Controversies involving new technologies, such as biotechnology, complement 
the normal educational channels for the diffusion of knowledge [...] and mobilize an ever-wider range of people to 
participate in the representation of the issue in the public sphere” … “In a democracy, public familiarity with an 
issue is a precondition for realistic and sustainable decision-taking pertaining to it”, Bauer and Bonfadelli 2002:153. 
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communication theories. The resistance to genetic science and gene technology did not correspond 
to traditional sociological variables like class, education and gender either, nor was the resistance 
uniform (Nielsen et al. 2002:179). The findings led the social scientists into a search for cultural 
explanations. The first analytical answer to the heterogeneity of the material led to a distinction 
between different “segmentations” of the resistance through new analytical categories: politically 
“blue” and politically “green” resistance. In a second step, they searched for perspectives to explain 
the two different types of resistance. In the comparison of material from seventeen countries in 
Europe, data strongly suggests that two categories of skeptics, “traditional” and “modern”, are well 
defined and distinct, and constitute a “striking commonality” in the nature of skepticism across 
Europe (Nielsen et al. 2002:187). This led to a new cluster analysis, in line with a growing interest 
in the relation between people's opinion and cultural images of modern biotechnology. To add 
explanatory depth to the analysis of the two segments in the material, the researchers decided to 
identify what they understood as implied cultural images structuring the resistance: 
 
[T]he “blue” critique is “Faustian” - the whole enterprise of biotechnology may be conceived 
as a modern covenant with Mephistopheles. Even though biotechnology represents 
technological success, insight into, and the manipulation of Nature, it is considered 
problematic. In contrast, the “green” skepticism is more “Frankensteinian”. The problem they 
identify concerns the insufficient knowledge of potential consequences ... The danger is 
perceived as the possible creation of a “monster” capable of developing in unforeseen and 
uncontrollable ways, and conceivably coming to usurp its creators. (Nielsen et al. 2002:191; 
Nielsen et al 2000:250)  
 
The cultural images of Faust and of Frankenstein that Nielsen et al. have identified as having 
(cultural-) analytical relevance, is not explained theoretically or conceptually. They merely state 
that new tools are needed, and that these images fit. This is a pragmatic analytical solution 
motivated by analytical needs. The strategy overlaps with Turney’s analysis. Turney is an historian 
of ideas who has focused on the story of Frankenstein in his “history of public imagination of 
biology” (Turney 1998:2). Like Nelkin and Lindee, he approaches the story of Frankenstein 
through the concept of myth.  His conclusion is that the Frankenstein myth is alive and well, just 
like what he calls its sociological cousin, the Brave New World. He explains that myth maintains 
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significance if it is continually retold, and that the feature of a myth is that the particulars change 
but the plot remains the same (Turney 1998:207). Seen together, Nielsen et al., Turney, and Nelkin 
and Lindee, they all point out how specific stories, like the stories of Frankenstein, continue to be 
represented and retold in relation to gene technology, and represent cultural significance. The focus 
is primarily on cultural narratives as carriers of norms and values. None of them investigates more 
thoroughly how cultural narratives are a resource in dynamic processes of interpreting the present, 
as carriers of histories of past experiences, as a means that make it possible to discuss the relation 
between past and future, and how myth and folk stories are part of an exegetical tradition with 
interpretative patterns that continuously relate mythic narratives with memory and experience.  
 
The public science debate, together with national politics and economies, represent historical and 
specific conditions that entail contextual realities and geographic locations for people's opinions. 
If the hermeneutical aspect of the relation between myth and history had been more thoroughly 
investigated, it could open up analyses of how different locations (Europa and USA) represent 
different attitudes, and why knowledge (as a parameter in the analysis of public opinion) needs to 
include knowledge about contemporary history.  
 
Within the field of folklore, it is well known how public and scholarly images and understandings 
overlap,25 just as popular and scholarly use of images do in the material that is presented by Nelkin 
and Lindee in their DNA Mystique. My assumption is that the important contexts for public opinion 
are just as complex and substantial as contexts are in the gene science debate. In analysis of the 
public science debate, for example in Segerstråle's analysis, the individual scientists are analyzed 
as bearers of political agendas motivated by past incidents. In the analysis of public opinion, 
people’s agenda is treated as less significant than the scientists' agenda and reduced to issues of 
specific knowledge about genetic science, and to religion, norms and values. A broader agenda that 
includes history and politics, assuming that people in general and scientists have shared interests 
and fears, has not yet been proposed as a main theme in the analysis of the Eurobarometer surveys. 
 
  
                                                        
25 Folk beliefs and understandings are not a strict opposite or contrast to science or learned understandings. On the 
contrary, the two overlap in individuals’ lives, for people in general as well as for scholars. See for example on folk 
belief: Eriksen 1991; Bugge Amundsen 1989; Bø 1986; Alver & Selberg 1992.   
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Conclusion   
 
The historic dimension of myth and genetics 
 
References to myth and religious heritage, in the material I have presented, have a specific function. 
The references do not represent religious belief or theological exegesis, but appear as a particular 
interpretative strategy that enables the inclusion of specific themes. The genre of myth represents 
the fundamentals of reality, its building blocks and premises, its inhabitants and agents, it gives 
knowledge about the relation between them, which dramas they are part of, potential or expected 
outcomes. Myth, or references to myth, in the texts I have referred to relate to genetic science and 
gene technology as a strategy. This strategy explicitly pushes for, or denies, mythic characteristics 
in genetic science and gene technology. The strategy turns genetic science and gene technology 
into a contemporary drama, even a cosmological drama, at least when the fight between good and 
evil, preservation and destruction is included.  
 
The use of references to myth and religious heritage is a dual interpretative process where some 
aspects are defined as mythic while other aspects are defined as non-mythic. These strategies of 
mythologization and demythologization represent a quest to understand how events and activities 
are connected with agents and relations, with a particular time (past, present or future) and space, 
and how it affects premises for present and future life, in a this-worldly story. It is not religious 
belief or a particular religion as such that is of importance, it is the relation between knowledge, 
politics and consequences. References to myth and religious heritage is a way of presenting history, 
and it is the relevance of memory and knowledge about reality, what reality consists of, how its 
parts are interrelated, which dramas it contains that we need to be aware of, and how to act when 
or if a particular drama is taking place.  
 
With reference to Robertson, Peter Beyer refers to the dual process of “politicization of theology 
and religion … and the ‘theologization’ of politics” (Beyer 1994:30). In the material I have 
presented, references to myth and religious heritage are juxtaposed with references to World War 
II. The post-war history of genetic science and gene technology, of how scientific practice changed 
during WWII, and new relations between academics, politics and industry were established, new 
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policies and political strategies were developed etc., is a history that is well known to the partakers 
in the gene-science debate, though it is not elaborated in the debate.  
 
The post-war history of genetic science and gene technology matches the mythic character of the 
gene-science debate. It involves national governments and national and international research 
groups and companies with political and economic visions, aiming to radically change or improve 
agriculture, medicine and pharmacy, and energy production. As a key context for the gene science 
debate, and the radical science groups in particular, the post-war history seems to confirm that 
genetic science and gene technology are activities that fit the narrative genre of myth. 
 
The way I understand the gene science debate, “mythologization” is not a strategy to turn politics 
religious, and “demythologization” is not a strategy to desanctify a phenomenon. They are both 
strategies taken to either dispute or state the relevance of mythic knowledge in concrete situations. 
It is knowledge, and not (liberal or fundamentalist) belief that is at stake.  
 
The interpretation of myths generates norms and values, though the ones Peter Beyer identifies as 
characteristic of globalized world are secondary in my material, or ambiguous. It is not (neo-) 
liberal values that are of importance, but sustainability regarding food supply, health, production 
of energy, and the risk of large scale and even irreversible horrors. At stake is equality and progress, 
but not as a conflict between (neo-)liberal versus particularistic fundamentalist understandings. 
Instead equality is at risk in terms of justice and risks. And progress is not a common ideal but the 
very thing the dispute is all about. As an alternative to the concept of progress, critics of genetic 
science and gene technology elaborate on what sustainability (not progress) may imply when one 
discusses the relation between science and society, or knowledge and power. And they include 
priorities, production, availability, ownership, distribution of health and wealth, and the relation 
between private, national, and international economies in the discussion. For the proponents it is 
about economics and competition, and for the critics it is about the consequences and predictable 
or unforeseen risks for society and nature.  
 
The globalized values Peter Beyer refers to seem to imply a chasm between the past and the future. 
In my material, debates and public opinion related to genetic science and gene technology work 
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quite differently by pointing out the inseparable relation between past, present and future life. The 
debates about gene technology, and public opinion on gene technology, are preoccupied with 
knowledge, consequences, and how the past represents resources and relations between humans 
and the society and environment we are located in. Resources and relations are understood as 
limited and represent challenges one needs to understand and be aware of. Knowledge about the 
past and present becomes fundamental for the future. Visions of the future are not unlimited, and 
they cannot be captured in ideas of the progress of human civilization, but are based on a critical 
examination of the same. Both public debate and academic analysis appear as hermeneutical 
exercises focused on interpreting and investigating the relation between past and future. Debates 
and opinions strive to investigate the space between limitation and possibilities. It is the 
investigation that is of importance. Beyer’s approach to religion as a sub-system in globalized 
society presents religion as a political project directed in one of two directions, liberal or 
conservative. Debates and public opinion in my material, that use myth and religious heritage as a 
resource, cannot be reduced to a particularistic/right vs left/liberal political agenda. Resistance or 
critique comes from both political left and right. And in the field of science, conflicts are not 
reducible to different fields of research. Scientists representing the same philosophical, 
epistemological and methodological traditions might disagree, just as other scientists agree despite 
representing quite different traditions and methodologies. 
 
Several scholars have chosen to use myth as an analytical key concept or perspective when they 
analyze public opinion and attitudes to genetic science and gene technology. Their understanding 
tends to see attitudes and opinions as religious beliefs, or folk beliefs rooted in religious myths and 
folk narratives. In parallel, science history has shown how science today is returning to the kind of 
practice that developed during World War II, when science was turned into a team-based problem-
solving activity aiming to create products with a comprehensive impact. Society has been deeply 
involved in science, and science has not been an isolated activity outside of society in the post 
World War II era. On the contrary, after World War II, science moved into the center of political, 
industrial and governmental strategic decision-making. Science and technology in the field of 
genetic science and gene technology became an arena for huge societal and industrial expectations. 
It was given economic priority and started to involve people from new areas of society, media, 
decision makers and policy makers. It is this new societal and political situation, where science is 
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expected to generate social, economic and in some cases biological consequences, that the British 
and US radical scientists operate. I believe that public opinion also needs to be understood in 
relation to this societal and economic context they have been involved in or affected by.  
 
Finally, myth, religious heritage and folk narratives can be understood as a resource within a 
strategy to take the potency and potential failure of science seriously. The relation between myth 
and history appears as both dynamic and contextual in character. To be made relevant, myth has to 
be related to a specific time and space. And for myth to be more than a rhetorical trope, history 
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